

SASC

OLL 85-1455
9 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons

1. On 9 May 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) was briefed on the global proliferation of chemical weapons (CW). The codeword briefing took place in SROB 222 from 0900-1115. A transcript was taken.

Present from the Committee were:

Barry Goldwater, Chmn (R., AZ)

John Warner (R., VA)
Gordon Humphrey (R., NH)
William Cohen (R., ME)
Dan Quayle (R., IN)


Sam Nunn, (D., GA)
Ranking Minority Mbr
Edward Kennedy (D., MA)
Alan Dixon (D., IL)
John Glenn (D., OH)

Present from the Committee staff were:

Doug Graham
Bob Bott
Arnold Punaro.

Present from CIA were:

David Low



National Intelligence Office at Large
Assistant National Intelligence Officer 25X1
at Large

Officer of Scientific and Weapons Research


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2. Mr. Low opened the briefing by stating that the Intelligence Community is currently engaged in an analytic study of the emerging new phenomena of CW proliferation. He briefly traced the evolution of this development, citing the growth in the number of states that have acquired or are establishing a CW capability. His comments also touched on the characteristics of Third World offensive CW programs, including the most common types of CW agents, delivery methods, and costs of production. Some time was spent in explaining the process for establishing a CW production line, the chemistry and manufacturing technology employed, and the heavy reliance on imported expertise,

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chemicals, and highly sophisticated equipment. Various third world countries were discussed as examples of how CW programs have been developed and how chemical weapons have been used, such as in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war. [redacted]

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3. In the second portion of the briefing, [redacted] discussed Iraq's CW facilities and the methodology used by the Intelligence Community to estimate Iraq's CW production capability. He pointed out the difficulty of trying to prevent countries such as Iraq from importing essential chemicals and equipment, most of which have dual purposes. The expectation is that CW will become an integral part of national weapons arsenals and be utilized with increasing frequency. [redacted]

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4. [redacted] presentation covered Soviet R&D efforts in the field of genetically engineered novel agents. She described analytic efforts to pinpoint production facilities in the USSR and said it is possible that the Soviets are working on genetically engineered micro-organisms, toxins, and psychologically active compounds that produce reactions such as fear and sleep. [redacted]

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5. Questions from the few Senators who remained for the entire briefing focused on possible terrorist use of CW, Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan, Cuba's CW capability, and the security classification restraints that prevent the American public from learning more about the CW threat as presented in the briefing. Sen. Quayle mentioned that the Administration is overdue in providing him with a report on the adequacy of U.S. resources focused on the CW problem. [redacted]

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6. The briefing closed with a word of commendation by Chairman Goldwater. There were no follow-up requests. The briefing conformed to the plan worked out with Mr. Graham during a pre-briefing session with [redacted] and Mr. Low on 7 May at headquarters. [redacted]

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[redacted]
Liaison Division

Office of Legislative Liaison

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[redacted]
Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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